OT and ICS Security Assessment

Operational technology cannot be assessed the way IT is. Active scanning that is routine on a corporate network can knock over a controller that was never designed to tolerate it — and on a building or plant network, that is not an inconvenience, it is an incident. This is the main reason OT environments go unassessed for years.

Our OT and ICS security assessment is deliberately passive: we work from captured traffic and configuration review. We do not scan, probe, inject packets or interact with your control network.

What We Assess

  • Asset discovery — what is actually on the network, which is frequently not what the documentation says.
  • Protocol exposure — BACnet, Modbus, DNP3, S7comm, EtherNet/IP, OPC UA and others, and what they reveal.
  • Segmentation reality — whether OT and IT are separated in practice or only on the diagram.
  • Remote access paths — how vendors and technicians get in, and what that grants them.
  • Authentication and credential exposure — shared accounts, default credentials, cleartext protocols.
  • Niagara and BAS configuration — user accounts, permissions, exposed services, station hardening.

Why Passive Is the Feature

“We will never touch your control network” is what makes the assessment possible at all. Facilities and plant teams have usually refused security assessment for good reason; removing the risk of disruption removes the objection.

The Advantage of Knowing Both Sides

Most security firms can read a packet capture. Far fewer can tell you what a malformed BACnet broadcast storm does to a building, or whether a Niagara station’s permission model is sane. Our sister practice SoftwarePile engineers these systems daily, so findings come with remediation that is actually implementable. More detail on the tooling is on our OT and network forensics page.

Tell us what you need assessed — and what must not be touched. We will scope it around that constraint.

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What Passive Capture Shows, and What It Does Not

A capture is a record of what happened on the wire while it was running. Anything that did not speak during the window does not appear. A controller polled once a shift, a pump station that runs seasonally, an engineering laptop that only shows up when a vendor visits: any of these can be entirely absent from an otherwise complete capture. Configuration review closes part of that gap, since a device can sit in a switch table or a firewall rule without ever generating traffic, but the two sources are complementary and neither is a full inventory on its own.

The second limit is about certainty. Observation establishes that a path exists and that a service is reachable from where the capture was taken. It does not establish that the path can be exploited, because confirming that would mean sending something, which is the one thing the method excludes. Findings are written as exposure and reachability, not as proof of compromise. That distinction matters most when the report reaches someone who wanted a demonstration.

  • Cleartext protocols give up nearly everything: function codes, register values, account names, and sometimes the credentials themselves.
  • Encrypted or tunneled traffic still reveals endpoints, timing, volume and direction, which is often enough to identify an undocumented remote access path even when the contents stay closed.
  • Firmware and version detail appears only when a device announces it or when the configuration export contains it. There is no active query to fill that in afterward.
  • Traffic that never crosses the capture point is invisible no matter how long the capture runs, which makes placement the decision that matters more than duration.

Where the Capture Actually Comes From

The usual capture point is a mirror or SPAN session on a managed switch that already carries the traffic of interest. That is a switch configuration change, and it is made by your network staff under your own change process. It is also why the first conversation is about your topology rather than about tooling: a mirror configured on the wrong switch produces a very clean capture of traffic you already understand.

A network TAP is a separate question. Installing one means breaking the link it will monitor, briefly but really, and that is a planned interruption that belongs to your maintenance scheduling. It is not part of this assessment. If your staff have already placed TAPs, or choose to place one during an outage that you schedule and perform, the capture can be taken from it. Either way, physical work on the control network stays with the people who own the network.

Many OT segments are wired through unmanaged switches, which have no mirror capability at all. When that is the case the capture point moves upstream to the OT and IT boundary, at the firewall or the router. That shows every conversation crossing the boundary and none of the device to device traffic inside the segment. It is a real answer for segmentation and remote access questions and a weak one for asset discovery, and it is better to know which you are getting before the capture starts than to work it out during analysis.

Duration is chosen around your operational cycles rather than by the clock. A building with night setback, a plant with shift changes, a site whose integrator connects on a weekly rhythm: each argues for a window that contains at least one full cycle of whatever you care about. We ask what those cycles are because they cannot be inferred from traffic that has not been captured yet. Capture files also grow quickly, so where they are written and how much space is available is worth settling before the session is turned on.

What the Engagement Depends On From You

A passive method moves work onto the customer that an active scan would have done for itself. None of it is unusual, and none of it can be substituted.

The other dependency is a decision rather than an artifact: where the capture data lives, how it is transferred, and how long it is kept. Captures from a control segment can contain cleartext credentials and detailed process data, so they deserve to be handled at the sensitivity of the systems they describe. Settle that before capture rather than after, because a requirement that data never leaves your environment constrains where analysis can run and has to be arranged in advance.

  • A named person with the authority to configure the mirror session and to approve the change window it needs.
  • Whatever network documentation exists, including the parts known to be out of date. The gap between the diagram and the capture is itself a finding, so an inaccurate diagram is far more useful than none.
  • Configuration exports: switch and firewall configurations, device backups, user and permission exports from the management layer, and VPN or remote access configuration.
  • An explicit do not touch list, specific rather than general: named devices, named ports, hours that are off limits, and any equipment whose vendor agreement restricts what may be attached to it.
  • The remote access inventory as your organization believes it to be. Comparing the documented list against the paths that appear in traffic produces a large share of the useful findings, and that comparison needs the documented list to exist.

When an Assessment Is Not the Right Next Step

There are situations where this engagement produces an accurate document and no change. They are worth recognizing before scoping rather than after delivery.

  • You are dealing with an active incident. An assessment answers what the environment looks like normally. It is not built to answer what happened during an event, which is incident response and digital forensics work and starts from different questions.
  • You already know the OT and IT networks are flat and that vendors connect through paths nobody controls. An assessment will confirm it in detail. Design work changes the network; an assessment only describes it. If the decision to remediate is already made, segmentation and remote access design is the work that moves it.
  • You already hold captures and configuration exports from your own tooling. In that case the scope narrows to interpretation of data you already have, rather than collection plus interpretation, and it should be scoped that way from the start.
  • The system is not yet commissioned. A greenfield network has no operational traffic to capture and no accumulated drift to find. Reviewing the design, the addressing plan and the intended remote access model is the useful work at that stage.
  • You need proof that a specific device can be exploited. Passive work will not produce it. Say so early, because that requirement points to lab testing against identical hardware rather than to anything done on a production network.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is this a penetration test?

No, and it is not a vulnerability scan or an audit against a named compliance framework either. What it produces is a written set of findings in which each item is traceable to the specific traffic or configuration line it came from, so a claim in the report can be checked rather than accepted on trust. It is also not a monitoring product: nothing is installed and nothing is left behind when the engagement ends.

What has to already exist on our side before any capture can happen?

A managed switch at the point where you want visibility, with a spare port and the ability to run a mirror session, plus someone holding the rights to configure it. You also need to be able to export device and firewall configurations, or to grant read access so they can be pulled. If the segment runs on unmanaged switches there is no mirror to configure, and the capture point moves to the OT boundary instead, which changes what is visible: traffic crossing the boundary yes, device to device traffic inside the segment no. Establishing which case you are in is the first thing that happens.

How does the rollout actually proceed, in order?

It starts with scoping: what you want answered, what must not be touched, and where the edges of the environment are. Capture points are then chosen against your documentation, and your own staff configure the mirror session under your change process. A short verification capture comes before the real one, to confirm the port is carrying the traffic that was expected rather than spending a long window on a wrong guess. The capture then runs while configuration exports are collected in parallel, and analysis begins once both are in hand. Findings are reviewed with the people who operate the systems, since they are the ones who can say whether a path that looks wrong is in fact deliberate.

Does this integrate with the security and asset tools we already run?

Not by connecting to them: no agent, collector or appliance is added to your environment. What comes out of the work can be fed into what you already run, mainly the asset list, which can be delivered in a form you can reconcile against an existing inventory or maintenance system. If you run a SIEM, the assessment does not send it data, but the findings identify which OT traffic is worth building detections for. That gap is common enough that it usually appears as a finding in its own right, since most IT side monitoring has no visibility into the control network at all.

Who holds the capture files and configuration exports, and what happens to them afterward?

That is set during scoping and it stays your decision. Capture files from a control segment can contain cleartext credentials and detailed process data, which is precisely why cleartext protocols are among the things being looked for, so they should be handled at the sensitivity of the systems they describe. If your policy requires that the data never leaves your environment, say so before capture rather than after, because it determines where analysis can run and that has to be arranged in advance. Retention and disposal at the end of the engagement belong in the written scope rather than being left implicit.

What do we have to decide before this starts?

Decide what you want answered, what must not be touched, where the capture points are, who authorizes the switch change, where the data is stored, and who receives the findings. The first two shape everything else, and the do not touch list works better when it is specific: named devices, named ports, hours that are off limits, and any equipment whose vendor agreement limits what may be attached to it. The rest can be settled quickly, but leaving any of them open tends to stall the work at exactly the point where the capture was supposed to begin.

Can this be done remotely, or does someone have to be on site?

The two halves of the work have different requirements. Capture setup is physical and happens at the site, because a mirror session has to be configured on a specific switch and a capture host has to be connected to that port. Analysis works from files and does not need to be anywhere in particular, which is why the two are usually separated. If your own network staff can configure the mirror and hand over the capture, the engineering side can proceed without anyone traveling; if nobody on site can do that, someone has to be present for the setup portion.

What happens after the findings are delivered?

What happens next depends on who owns remediation, so decide that before the report lands rather than after: an assessment with no named owner produces findings that nobody is accountable for acting on. It also matters that the owner has scheduling authority, because some changes can be made during normal operation and others need a maintenance window on the OT side. If findings touch systems maintained under a vendor contract, that vendor has to be part of the conversation, and it is better to identify which findings those are early than to discover it at implementation time.