Almost every organisation has backups. Far fewer have ever restored one under pressure, and fewer still can say how long it took or whether the application actually started afterwards. A backup that has never been restored is a hypothesis, and a ransomware incident is a poor time to test it.
Status: product concept, in active development. This is something we are building, not something you can buy today. We publish our roadmap because the engineering thinking behind it is the useful part — and because we would rather show you the design than imply a finished product.
Designed Capabilities
- Backup and recovery-plan inventory — what is protected, and what quietly is not.
- Isolated restore orchestration — real restores into a sealed environment, routinely.
- Integrity and malware checks — confirm you are not restoring the infection.
- Application and dependency startup tests — data restored is not the same as service restored.
- Database consistency validation — the restore is coherent, not merely complete.
- RPO and RTO measurement — measured, not assumed from the policy document.
- Recovery evidence and gap reporting — proof for auditors and insurers.
- Remediation workflow and recurring schedules — gaps become tracked work.
Proof Beats Policy
The point is to replace a stated recovery objective with a measured one. Knowing a critical system restores and starts in four hours — because it was tested last week — is a very different conversation with the board than pointing at a document claiming it should.
Tell us if this matches a problem you have — early input shapes what we build first, and we will give you an honest view of where it stands.
Related services
- Incident Response and Digital Forensics — Recovery starts with containment: incident response and digital forensics.